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Cianci v. Superior Court: RICO, A
Runaway Statute Now Running into
State Court
Among the most important decisions facing an attorney in mod-
ern litigation is whether to sue in state or federal court.' The
decision ultimately may determine the length and cost of the
litigation, the outcome on the merits, and the likelihood of success
on appeal .2 The choice between state and federal court, however,
is not always available to the attorney, since federal courts have
limited jurisdiction. Congress has explicitly granted federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal causes of action.' Some
statutes, on the other hand, fail to indicate whether Congress
intended federal jurisdiction to be exclusive over a particular cause
of action.4 If exclusive jurisdiction has not been specifically granted
to the federal courts, state courts presumptively share jurisdiction
concurrently with the federal courts.5 The Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act 6 of 1970 (RICO) does not clearly
delegate jurisdictional authority.
1. Kirsch, Which courthouse? What advantage?, CAL. LAw., May 1986, at 31. See
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CrvIL PROCEDURE § 2.2 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as FRIEDENTHAL].
2. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 31.
3. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 2.2. Exclusive federal jurisdiction means that a state
court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. In contrast, when jurisdiction is concurrent,
a state court can hear and decide a federal claim. Id.
4. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-
1968 (West 1984); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1973).
5. See infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction).
6. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984). In this Note, "RICO" refers to the private
civil enforcement scheme of § 1964(c) of RICO, unless otherwise indicated. The statute
also contains a criminal enforcement scheme which includes imprisonment, fines, and
forfeitures for violations of RICO. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West 1984).
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RICO prohibits profiting from a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." 7 The statute is an attractive area of the law for attorneys
because civil plaintiffs can sue for treble damages and attorneys'
fees based upon garden variety8 commercial disputes.9 Moreover,
Congress has explicitly directed the courts to interpret RICO
broadly. 10 Although the original purpose of Congress in enacting
RICO was to attack the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime, the majority of RICO claims have been asserted
against persons not associated with professional criminal organi-
zations. 1 The expanded use of RICO against so-called "legitimate"
business has prompted a great deal of debate. 12 Critics perceive
7. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 1984). See also infra note 26 and accompanying
text (discussing the elements of a RICO cause of action).
8. The expression "garden-variety" as used in RICO cases refers to "fraudulent"
conduct in the marketplace that, without reliance upon RICO, is subjected to regulation
pursuant to statutory schemes or traditional common law doctrines. GUIDE TO RICO 27
(Corp. Prac. Series, BNA 1986).
9. See infra notes 11-14, 34 & 40 and accompanying text (discussing the excessive use
of RICO in commercial disputes). Numerous commentators have called RICO an "alluring"
or "popular" area of the law. Cole & MacNamara, Civil Rico After Sedima, LITIOATION,
Spring 1986, at 24; Steinhouse, RICO: An Introduction and Description, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 303, 303 (1983); Coffield, If RICO Is Applied to Securities Fraud, Can Antitrust Be
Far Behind?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 379, 379 (1983).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
11. A.B.A., SEC. OF CORP. BANKING & Bus. L., REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO
TASK FORCE 55 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. Of the reported civil RICO
cases decided at the trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud and 37% involved
common law fraud in a commercial or business setting. Only 9% of the civil RICO cases
involved allegations of criminal activities of a type generally associated with "professional
criminals." Id. at 55-56. Of RICO cases filed between November 1985 and June 1986,
34% involved securities transactions and 30% involved commercial and contract disputes.
Kennedy, Civil RICO in the Antitrust Context, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 487 (1986).
Moreover, the number of cases appears to be spiralling upwards. See generally Lauter &
Strasser, Holding Pattern: Civil RICO, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 30, 1985-Jan. 6, 1986, at S-9 (one
major securities firm currently has 253 RICO suits pending); Galen, Litigation Blitz Hits
Accountants, Nat'l L.J., June 16, 1986, at 27 ("virtually all securities cases brought today
include a RICO claim"). The use of RICO against businesses and professions has increased
dramatically. Nathan, Doubling the Treble Damage Option: What an Antitrust Practitioner
Needs to Know About RICO, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 327 (1983). See also Ginger, Business'
Civil RICO Liability Goes Unchecked: No Previous Conviction Required, 24 A1.. Bus.
L.J. 179, 179 (1986) (federal courts flooded with RICO claims against banks, accountants,
and securities brokerages); Flaherty, A RICO Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at I
[hereinafter cited as RICO Crisis] (during last seven years, RICO has become a principal
claim in a broad range of commercial disputes); GtmE TO RICO, supra note 8, passim
(discussing use of RICO in various civil contexts). Interestingly, big business has aggressively
asserted RICO claims against competitors. See Blakey, The Act Is Neither Anti-Business
Nor Pro-Business, It's Pro-Victim, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 25 [hereinafter cited as
Pro-Victim]. The RICO suits being brought by large corporations are also settling for huge
sums of money. For example, IBM's RICO suit against Hitachi Ltd. for alleged theft of
computer software settled for approximately $200 million. Id.
12. "To some, the federal racketeering act is a good law getting bad press. To others,
it's a bad law in need of redress. And, to those who are listening to both sides, it seems
like a fundamentally sound law that could use some careful adjustment." Anderson,
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that RICO is being asserted successfully in civil cases in which Con-
gress did not intend the statute to be used. 13 These critics therefore
call for either the courts or Congress to narrow the statute. 14 The
United States Supreme Court has nevertheless assented to the broad
application the lower courts have given to RICO's substantive
provisions. 15 The liberal interpretation of RICO's substantive pro-
visions has recently been extended to its procedural provisions by
the California Supreme Court in Cianci v. Superior Court. 6
The Cianci court determined that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over claims arising under RICO.17 RICO is already an
alluring area of the law to attorneys.' 8 The allure of bringing a
RICO claim can only increase if the claim may be brought in state
court as well as in federal court. 19 Concurrent jurisdiction will
therefore increase pressure on Congress to amend the statute.
Part I of this Note discusses the legal background of the juris-
dictional dispute over claims arising under RICO. 20 Part II sets
forth the facts of the Cianci case and the decision of the California
Supreme Court.2' Finally, the legal ramifications of the court's
ruling are examined in part 111.22
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. RICO
Congressional hearings during the 1960s demonstrated the extent
to which criminal organizations had corrupted or taken over legit-
Problems of Private RICO Remedies and Suggested Legislative Solutions, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
20, 1986, at 22.
13. Many argue that RICO is being used to circumvent established statutory safeguards.
See GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 27; Kennedy, supra note 11, at 467-74. Critics of
RICO also argue that the statute encourages the filing of frivolous claims which defendants
settle and are forced to overvalue because of the risks of treble damages and the unfair
labeling of RICO defendants as "racketeers." GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 26. Thus,
critics claim there has been a tendency to "RICOize" everything. RICO Crisis, supra note
11, at 31.
14. The use of RICO has been widely criticized by experts, who have pressed Congress
to amend the statute. Lauter & Strasser, supra note 11, at S-9; Anderson, supra note 12,
at 22.
15. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985) (only Congress can
limit the statute's application); see also infra notes 85-91 (discussing liberal construction
of RICO).
16. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
17. Id. at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
18. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (discussing allure of RICO).
19. See infra notes 177-214 and accompanying text (discussion of potential advantages
of concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims).
20. See infra notes 23-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 96-168 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 169-241 and accompanying text.
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imate businesses, unions, and units of state and local government.23
RICO24 was incorporated as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 to bolster the anti-organized crime effort.2" In
general, the statute prohibits persons associated with enterprises
involved in interstate commerce from conducting, or conspiring to"
conduct, business affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. ' ' 26 RICO strengthened the evidence gathering process, estab-
lished new penal prohibitions, and provided new remedies and
increased sanctions .27
In addition to allowing the government to impose criminal and
civil sanctions,28 RICO also created a private right of action for
treble damages. 29 The many supporters0 of a private civil enforce-
23. See generally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEm'. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Pro-
Victim, supra note 11, at 24; Coffield, supra note 9, at 380; GUIDE TO RICO, supra note
8, at 4-5 (all presenting in-depth discussion of RICO's legislative history, including the
McClellen Committee hearings).
24. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984).
25. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
589 (1981); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3288 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The principal sponsors of RICO were former Senators John L. McClellan, D-
Ark., Roman L. Hruska, R-Neb., and former U.S. Representative Richard L. Poff.
Pro-Victim, supra note 11, at 24. Robert Blakey, chief counsel to the McClellan Committee
when RICO was enacted, was RICO's principal author. Id.
26. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)-(d) (Vest 1984). See generally GUIDE TO RICO, supra note
8, at 8-9. Section 1961 defines the constituent elements of a RICO action, which include
(1) "person," (2) "enterprise," (3) "racketeering activity," and (4) "pattern of racketeering
activity." See GUIE To RICO, supra note 8, at 4-6 (full discussion of the essential
elements, and present state of the law). A "pattern of racketeering activity" may be
demonstrated by the existence of two or more "predicate acts." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5)
(vest 1984). The predicate offenses are set forth in a cookbook listing in § 1961(1). The
commission of two or more such acts within a 10-year period constitutes a "pattern" of
racketeering activity. Id. § 1961(5) (vest 1984).
27. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
28. Section 1963 provides for criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West 1984). See
GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing the criminal enforcement scheme). While
criminal RICO has been principally asserted against "organized crime," the vast majority
of civil RICO cases have been against "legitimate" businesses. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text (discussion of use of RICO against "legitimate" businesses). Restricting
the use of criminal RICO to organized crime is due to the Justice Department's "RICO
Guidelines." GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 10. Prosecutors' growing use of RICO to
sieze illegally gained assets and businesses has resulted in an unprecedented wave of
organized crime prosecutions around the country. Daunes, The Organized Crime Fight
Heads into the Midwest, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 13, 1986, at 10. The Attorney General may also
seek civil remedies, including divestiture and other equitable relief, pursuant to § 1964(a)-
(b). See GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 10. Only very recently, however, has the
government utilized the civil enforcement scheme. The first use of civil RICO by the
government was in 1982 against Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Scrivener, U.S. Sues Union in Test Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
29. Section 1964(c) permits the award of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees to
"[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962." 18
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ment scheme viewed civil RICO not only as a remedy for the honest
businessman who was damaged by unfair competition from the
racketeer businessman, but also as an additional deterrent to RICO
violations through private attorneys general.31 Thus, through RICO,
Congress sought the eradication of organized crime from the United
States .32
Although RICO was established in 1970, the civil bar essentially
ignored the statute for more than a decade.3 3 Over the last seven
years, however, the use of RICO has dramatically increased.3 4 RICO
U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984). The private right of action was incorporated into RICO
so that private persons could supplement enforcement by the Department of Justice by
acting as "private attorneys general," as well as provide a deterrent to potential violators
of the statute. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. Private plaintiffs may also be
entitled to equitable relief. See GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that the courts
are split on the availability of private injunctive relief under RICO); but see Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying equitable relief).
Punitive damages are not recoverable under RICO, although a RICO claim can often be
coupled with common law fraud claims under which punitive damages generally are
recoverable. GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 11-12.
30. Pro-Victim, supra note 11, at 24. Following the McClellan hearings, those rec-
ommending or showing support for a treble damages provision in RICO included the
President's Crime Commission of 1967, the ABA, the National Chamber of Commerce,
and the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id.
31. 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969).
32. Id. See also GUImE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 5. The purpose of RICO was "the
elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering activity into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce." Id. at 5 (citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)). Since Congress could not constitutionally enact a crime
punishing only "mobsters," the statute proscribed certain kinds of conduct most commonly
associated with the activities of organized crime when attempting to gain control or influence
over "legitimate" enterprises. Id. See also Blakey & Golstock, "On the Waterfront"-
RICO and Labor Rackteering, 1980, 17 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 341, 342 (1980).
33. Hartwell, Criminal RICO and Antitrust, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311 (1983). See
generally Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg,
58 NOTRE DimE L. REv. 237 (1982) (private bar first discovered the potential of RICO in
1979); Tarlow, Using the RICO Statute in Civil Litigation, Nat'l L.J., May 24, 1982, at
17. "Until recently, the criminal provisions of the statute were virtually the only source
of RICO litigation .... [T]he civil bar remained essentially oblivious to the enormous
potential of RICO civil actions." Id.
34. ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 53a Table. Of the 270 federal district court RICO
decisions prior to 1985, only 3% were decided during the 1970s. In the 1980s, use of RICO
increased by 2% in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. Id.
See supra note 11 (breakdown of substantive law during this period). Much of this increase
has been attributed to the 1981 decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), which determined that RICO applies to both
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. 452 U.S. at 587. Steinhouse, supra note 9, at
307. The number of suits is climbing even faster since Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105
S. Ct. 3275 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that RICO must be liberally construed
by the courts. Lauter & Strasser, supra note 11, at 16. See also Galen, supra note 11, at
26 (Sedima is expected to open the door for an even greater number of suits); Kennedy,
supra note 11, at 487 Appendix C (the vast majority of post-Sedima RICO cases involve
securities, contractual, or commercial disputes).
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has proved to be an alluring area of the law for a number of
reasons. The statute permits a prevailing party to recover litigation
costs, attorneys' fees, and treble damages for injuries resulting
from a violation of RICO.3 5 In addition, a RICO claim may be
based upon a variety of "predicate offenses" including mail, wire,
and securities fraud.36 Mail fraud and wire fraud actions have
historically been treated as ordinary commercial disputes restricted
to state courts under common law principles of tort or contract
law. 37 RICO allows these traditional state-law claims to be brought
directly into federal court, essentially federalizing the common law
of fraud.3 1
Furthermore, Congress has explicitly directed the courts to in-
terpret the statute broadly. 39 The congressional mandate of liberal
35. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984) provides that "[a]ny person injured by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter ... shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. RICO also
contains liberal procedural provisions governing, among other things, venue and jurisdic-
tion. GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 5-6. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1965-1968 (West 1984).
Section 1965 allows nationwide service of process wherever the person "resides, is found,
has an agent, or transacts his affairs." Id. § 1965(d) (West 1984). Under § 1965, RICO
provides broad venue provisions which allow a RICO civil action to be brought where the
defendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." Id. § 1965(a) (West
1984). In addition, venue may be asserted over "other parties" if venue is already
established over at least one defendant, and if "the ends of justice so require," even
though serving or joining these parties would ordinarily be improper. Id. § 1965(b) (West
1984). See GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 12; Farmer's Bank of Delaware v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Del. 1978). Furthermore, § 1965 allows subpoenas
of witnesses to be served in any judicial district, although only actions brought by the
government can utilize the broadened subpoena power. GuIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at
12.
36. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West 1984). Other offenses considered "racketeering
activity," and serving as "predicate" acts for a RICO lawsuit include federal substantive
law, such as murder, kidnapping, arson, extortion, drug-dealing, fraud, and transporting
stolen property interstate. Id.
37. Cole & McNamara, supra note 9, at 24. See also GUmDE To RICO, supra note 8,
at 22. "Until the advent of civil RICO, private litigants had no access to the mail or wire
fraud statutes .... [A] myriad of disputes which would in the past have been resolved
under traditional theories of law may now be raised . . . under RICO." Id.
38. GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 16. "Given the prevalence of the use of the
mails, interstate telephone calls, telexes, and wire transfers in commercial transactions,
[RICO] undoubtedly does federalize state common law fraud." Steinhouse, supra note 9,
at 309. Common law fraud is frequently defined by very liberal standards. Id. See also
Anderson, supra note 12, at 28 (as long as the mailings are sent to further the scheme,
the mailings themselves need not contain any misrepresentations); Nathan, supra note 11,
at 336 (very easy to satisfy common law fraud requirements). Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has stongly suggested that civil RICO requires only a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard rather than the far more difficult "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985).
Thus, the attorney with a detailed understanding of the mailand wire-fraud statutes can
utilize RICO to its fullest potential. See GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 23-27 (detailed
discussion of the mailand wire-fraud statutes).
39. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (RICO is to "be liberally
1272
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RICO interpretation has resulted in the successful assertion of a
RICO cause of action in an ever-increasing variety of commercial
cases,40 resulting in wide-ranging criticism that the treble damages
statute is being abused. 41 There is even speculation that a "RICO
bar" exists, specializing in RICO suits.42
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"). RICO is unique among federal laws because
it expressly directs courts to liberally. interpret the statute, and because RICO creates both
a criminal offense and a civil cause of action from existing crimes. Coffield, supra note
9, at 380; GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 14. However, few of the legislative statements
supporting a broad and liberal construction of the statute were made with reference to
RICO's private civil provisions. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Sedima concluded that
since RICO's purposes are most evident in the private right of action provision, the
congressional liberal construction mandate should be applied when construing the private
right of action. Id. at 3283 n.10, 3286.
40. GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 19. "Litigators, never at a loss for ingenuity,
naturally [find] the prospect of treble damages under Section 1964(c) (as well as the
possibility of invoking what might otherwise be unavailable federal jurisdiction) very inviting
for garden-variety fraud claims." Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20,
23 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (emphasis original). Indeed, RICO litigation has multiplied at an
explosive rate during the 1980s, due mostly to the inclusions of the criminal mail and wire
fraud statutes among the list of predicate acts upon which a RICO claim may be based.
GtID TO RICO, supra note 8, at 20, 22. See also ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 55
(37% of civil RICO cases based upon mall or wire fraud). Before its debut, RICO was
criticized by some members of Congress who viewed the statute as an "invitation for
disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen .... ." H.R. REP.
No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnmN. NEws
4007, 4083 (dissenting views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan). Indeed, the
fact that only nine percent of the RICO cases involved Mafia-type activities supports the
Congressmen's fears. See ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 55-56. These statistics, in large
part, motivated the ABA's Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force to recommend that the statute
be overhauled, observing that "as currently applied, the statute is grossly overbroad,
encompassing business transactions that could not have been foreseen or intended by
Congress when it passed these provisions." Id. at 1. See Civil RICO Claims Can Be
Brought in State Court, CAL. Bus. L. REP. (CEB) at 237 (May 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Civil RICO Claims].
41. The essence of the RICO controversy arises from two aspects of the statute. First,
the fact that RICO claims are brought against so-called "legitimate" business, is deemed
by some to be an "abuse" of a powerful legal weapon intended to be used primarily
against organized crime. See Nathan, supra note 11, at 342. Others, however, note that
since fraud costs the nation upwards of $200 billion each year, "RICO properly applies to
[fraud] no matter who engages in it." Blakey, A Vital Hedge Against Corporate Fraud,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1986, at F2, col. 1. A second alleged abuse of the statute centers
around the incentive to settle a RICO claim. A RICO defendant is subjected to the threat
of a triple damage award and the stigma of a "racketeer" label. See Nathan, supra note
11, at 342. Commentators suggest that RICO suits are therefore being brought as strike
suits to coerce settlement from so-called "deep pockets," persons and businesses not
traditionally considered to be "organized crime." Horn, The Venue of the Debate Shifts
from the Courts to the Congress, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 24; see also O'Brien,
Victims Or Racketeers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1986, at F2, col. I ("legitimate businesses are
more intimidated by RICO than by gangsters").
42. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Fielkow & Eisenberg, Civil RICO: The Insurers
Fight Back, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1 (1986). Presently, there are at least four legal
reporting services now selling RICO newsletters. Lauter & Strasser, supra note 11, at S-9.
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B. Concurrent Jurisdiction
When establishing a new federal cause of action, Congress can
either vest jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts or confer
jurisdiction concurrently upon both state and federal courts.43 If
the statute expressly states whether jurisdiction is exclusive or
concurrent, resolution of the question is not a problem. 44 Deter-
mining congressional intent becomes far more complex, however,
when the statute is silent as to state court jurisdiction.4 1
In response to the difficulty posed by congressional silence, the
United States Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Claflin v.
Houseman,46 established the presumption that state courts have
concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over federal causes of ac-
tion.47 Experts consider the presumption to reflect the understand-
ing of the founding fathers of our nation, as seen in their writings
and debates, and in the Constitution itself.48 The Claflin rule
remained unchanged for over a century until Gulf Offshore Oil
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,49 when the United States Supreme Court
articulated the current standard for determining whether a federal
claim can be brought in state court.50
In Gulf Offshore, the Court determined that Congress may
confine jurisdiction of a federal law to the federal courts either
43. Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75
MIcH. L. REv. 311, 313 (1976).
44. Id.
45. Id. See also id. at 359. Congress has, with relatively few exceptions, rarely
considered questions of jurisdictional allocation when enacting substantive legislation. Id.
46. 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
47. Id. at 136. The Claflin Court articulated the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction
when Congress is silent as follows: "[W]here jurisdiction may be conferred on the United
States courts, it may be made exclusive where not so by the Constitution itself; but, if
exclusive jurisdiction be neither express or implied, the State courts have concurrentjurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it." Id.
48. Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 728 (N.D. III. 1986) (citing Redish & Muench,
supra note 24, at 314).
49. 453 U.S. 473 (1981); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508(1962) (stating that the presumption has remained unmodified since Claflin).
50. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478. Gulf Offshore was an indemnity action. One of
Gulf Offshore's employees was injured while being evacuated from an offshore drilling
platform during a storm. The employee was injured while attempting to board a vessel
chartered by Mobil. Id. at 475-76. The platform was located above the seabed of the Outer
Continental Shelf. The Gulf Offshore Court had to determine whether federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over personal injury and indemnity cases arising under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356 (West 1986)). Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 475.
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implicitly or explicitly.51 Three factors which can rebut the pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction were set forth by the Gulf
Offshore Court.5 2 The Court first stated that the presumption can
be rebutted by showing that the explicit wording of the statute
confers exclusive jurisdiction.5 3 The Gulf Offshore decision empha-
sized, however, that the mere grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts does not deprive a state court of concurrent jurisdiction
over a matter of federal law.5 4 The Court next declared that the
presumption may be rebutted by demonstrating that the legislative
history unmistakably implies that Congress intended jurisdiction to
be exclusive.5 5 Finally, the Court determined that the presumption
may be rebutted by showing that state court jurisdiction is clearly
incompatible with the federal interests involved.5 6 To establish
"clear incompatibility" under Gulf Offshore, a court must consider
the desirability of uniform interpretation of the specific federal
statute 57 the expertise of federal judges in that area of federal
law, 58 and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to
distinctively federal claims.5 9
51. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478.
52. Id. The Court stated that "the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be
rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implications from legislative
history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests."
Id. Accord Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at 508.
53. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478. Determining whether the statute explicitly confers
exclusivity merely requires analysis of the express statutory language. See, e.g., id. at 478-
79 (jurisdictional provision of OCSLA silent); Valenzuela v. Kraft, 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.
1984) (jurisdictional provision of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, silent).
54. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479. The Court noted that although Congress
granted the federal courts original jurisdiction over OCSLA cases, "[i]t is black letter law
*.. that the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state
court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action." Id. at 478-79 (citations
omitted).
55. Id. at 478. In Gulf Offshore, one of the petitioner's arguments was premised upon
a perceived incompatibility between exclusive federal sovereignty over the Outer Continental
Shelf and state court jurisdiction over controversies relating to the Shelf. Id. at 480. The
Court determined that the congressional assertion of exclusive political jurisdiction over
the Shelf does not evince congressional intent to assert exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction
over controversies arising from activities in the area. Id. at 479-82. Instead, the Court set
forth several factors generally recommending exclusive federal court jurisdiction over a
particular matter. Id. at 483-84.
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id. at 483-84. The Court stated that uniform interpretation of OCSLA was
unnecessary since, although the personal injury action was brought under federal law, the
content of that law is borrowed from the law of the adjacent state. Id. at 484. The Court
thus concluded that "[t]here is no need for uniform interpretation of laws that vary from
State to State." Id.
58. Id. at 484. The Court determined that because state judges have greater expertise
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According to Gulf Offshore, the courts may therefore examine
the language, structure, legislative history, and underlying policies
of the particular federal law to determine whether the state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter arising under that
law. 60 Defeating the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction under
Gulf Offshore is, however, especially difficult when the legislative
history of the federal statute is minimal.61 The legislative history
concerning RICO is problematic in this regard. 62 There is no
evidence that Congress ever expressly considered the question ofjurisdiction over RICO causes of action. 63 Nevertheless, most of
the courts addressing the issue of jurisdiction over RICO claims
before 1986 determined that RICO required exclusive federal juris-
diction.64
in applying state laws, federal judges are no more qualified than state judges in applying
OSCLA. Id.
59. Id. Since OCSLA incorporates state law to govern its application, the Court
declared that there is no reason to think that state judges will be unsympathetic to a claim
only because it arises under federal law. Id.
60. See generally id. at 477-84. In Gulf Offshore, the Court concluded that "nothing
in the language, structure, legislative history, or underlying policies of OCSLA suggests
that Congress intended federal courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over personal injury
actions arising under OCSLA." Id. at 484.
61. See, e.g., id. at 484 (nothing in the language of the statute, legislative history, or
policies underlying OCSLA suggests a congressional intent of exlusive jurisdiction). But
see Valenzuela v. Kraft, 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (inferred congressional intent
regarding jurisdiction over Title VII actions (Civil Rights Act of 1964) by looking at
nonjurisdictional provisions).
62. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984). Compare Cianci v. Superior Court, 40
Cal. 3d 903, 916, 710 P.2d 375, 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582 (1985) (concurrent jurisdiction
over RICO claims) with Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd.-1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365,
1370-71 (1985) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over RICO claims) and County of Cook v.
Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985)
(exclusive federal jurisdiction over RICO claims).
63. See Flaherty, Two States Lay Claim to RICO, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1984, at 10. As
Robert Blakey, the principal draftsman of RICO, put the problem, "[t]here is nothing on
the face of the statute or in the legislative history" that touches on the question ofjurisdiction. "To my knowledge, no one even thought of the issue." Nevertheless, in
Blakey's opinion, "courts can infer from the statute that if Congress had thought about
it, they would have made [jurisdiction] exclusive." Id.
64. Prior to Cianci v. Superior Court, no federal appellate court had affirmatively
addressed the issue of state court jurisdiction over RICO claims. See infra note 243(discussing post-Cianci federal court decisions). Dicta in some federal court decisions
indicated some support for favoring the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. However,
the only two district courts which, in an in-depth analysis, applied the Gulf Offshore
factors to RICO, ruled in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Compare County of Cook
v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (detailed analysis, concluding
in favor of exclusivity), aff'd, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985) and Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration
Ltd.-1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-71 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (same) and Nordberg v. Lord,
Day & Lord, 107 F.R.D. 692, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (unsupported statement by the court
stating exclusive) and Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 822 (D. Md. 1985) (same) with
1276
1987 / Cianci v. Superior Court
C. Jurisdiction Over RICO Claims
Section 1964(c) of RICO provides that claims for violations of
the statute "may" be brought in a federal court.65 According to
Gulf Offshore, statutory language can defeat the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction only if the language explicitly limits juris-
diction to the federal courts. 66 Since the term "may" in RICO's
jurisdictional provision does not clearly and expressly limit juris-
diction, the courts have uniformly determined that the first Gulf
Offshore factor is not satisfied. 67 The second Gulf Offshore factor,
that Congress "unmistakably intended" federal exclusivity over
RICO claims, 6 has proved to be a common ground for courts to
find that the concurrent jurisdiction presumption is rebutted.
While legislative history concerning the intended scope of RICO's
criminal scheme is abundant, there is very little documentation of
Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (footnote
suggesting concurrent jurisdiction) and Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460,
1462 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (although unclear, stating that state courts probably have concurrent
jurisdiction over RICO claims because no express statutory directive to the contrary). Most
of the federal courts addressed the jurisdictional issue when resolving questions concerning
the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a state court adjudication. See, e.g., Midcon,
574 F. Supp. 902. The other federal court decisions involve the issue of removal from
federal court to state court. See, e.g., Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. 1365.
The highest courts in four states addressed the issue of concurrent jurisdiction during
1985. See infra note 243 (discussing post-1985 state court decisions). The California Supreme
Court was the only court to determine that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
RICO claims. The highest courts in Texas, New York, and Delaware concluded that
jurisdiction over RICO claims should be limited to the federal courts. Compare Cianci v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985) (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (very detailed analysis, concluding in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction) with Main Rusk Assoc. v. Interior Space Constructors, 699 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1985) and Levinson v. American Accident Reinsurance Group, 503 A.2d 632
(Del. Ch. 1985) and Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d
468, 473 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (all three determining that jurisdiction
is exclusive).
65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984) provides that "[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefore in any appropriate United States District Court." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West
1984) (emphasis added).
66. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussion of the first Gulf Offshore
factor rebutting the normal presumption).
67. Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1370 (infer); Midcon, 574 F. Supp. at 911-12 (infer). As
the California Supreme Court in Cianci put the resolution of the first Gulf Offshore factor,
"[i]t is not argued, nor could it be, that the provisions creating a private right of action
expressly confines jurisdiction over RICO claims to the federal courts." Cianci, 40 Cal.
3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing second Gulf Offshore factor).
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the intended scope of the statute's private civil scheme.6 9 In fact,
no legislative history exists expressing congressional intent on the
question of jurisdiction. 70 In County of Cook v. Midcon Corp. ,71
the district court nevertheless concluded that the similarities be-
tween RICO and an antitrust provision indicated that Congress
"unmistakably intended" that jurisdiction over RICO causes of
action be exclusive. 72 The jurisdictional language in RICO repeats
practically verbatim section 4 of the Clayton Act, 73 an antitrust
statute.74 Section 4 has been consistently interpreted to confer
exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts. 75 The Midcon court
concluded that since Congress must have known that courts had
construed virtually identical language as giving federal courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims, the use of the same
language in RICO manifested unmistakable congressional intent to
confer similar jurisdiction over claims arising under RICO. 76
Whereas the court in Midcon based its determination on an
antitrust analogy, another court, in Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration
Ltd.-1981A, 77 focused upon RICO as a complete statutory scheme
to determine that Congress intended RICO claims to lie exclusively
in the federal system. In Kinsey, the court refused to infer that
congressional silence in section 1964(c), a single narrow provision,
was equivalent to an affirmative grant of jurisdiction to the states. 78
The court, guided by a ninth circuit appellate court decision in-
69. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); see also Horn, supra note 41, at 36 (the legislative history
"is almost entirely devoted to the problem of the infiltration of Mafia-type criminals into
legitimate business"); supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussion of RICO's
legislative history).
70. See supra note 63 (principal draftsman of RICO stating that the issue of jurisdiction
was never discussed).
71. 574 F. Supp. 902 (1983), aff'd, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 912.
73. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 1973).
74. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984) with 15 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1973).
75. Midcon, 574 F. Supp. at 912 (citing Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448,
451 n.6 (1943) and Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252
U.S. 436, 440 (1920)).
76. Midcon, 574 F. Supp. at 912. See Levinson v. American Accident Reinsurance
Group, 503 A.2d 632, 635 (1985). In Levinson, the court agreed with the district court's
legislative analysis in Midcon, and further stated that "it is an accepted principle of
statutory construction that the legislature has constructive knowledge of judicial interpre-
tations of existing statutes when drafting new legislation." Id. But see Midcon, 773 F.2d
at 905 n.4 (doubting the sufficiency of analogizing to the antitrust laws to rebut the normal
presumption that state courts share concurrent jurisdiction over federal statutes).
77. 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985).
78. See id. at 1370-71.
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volving Title VII actions (Civil Rights Act of 1964), 79 concluded in
favor of exclusivity by looking at RICO as a complete statutory
scheme. 0 Looking at the underlying statute, the court observed
that the overall congressional intent of RICO was to halt the
expansion of organized racketeering activities. 81 The court noted
that to reach this end, Congress created a new cause of action,
along with a number of procedural mechanisms available only to
the federal courts. 82 The Kinsey court deduced that reserving the
procedural power necessary to implement the underlying objectives
of RICO solely with the federal system sufficiently established that
Congress unmistakably intended exclusive federal jurisdiction over
RICO claims, thus rebutting the concurrent jurisdiction presump-
tion of the second Gulf Offshore factor.83
Prior to late 1985, no court applied the third Gulf Offshore
factor concerning the "clear incompatibility" of federal interests
with state court adjudication to the RICO statute.84 In 1985,
however, the United States Supreme Court rendered a landmark
decision concerning RICO interpretation which has since been used
in the jurisdictional analysis. Although the decision did not involve
the question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
79. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984). In Valenzuela, the court
held that federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The ninth
circuit used the Gulf Offshore factors as the framework for its jurisdictional analysis. The
court first noted that the jurisdictional provision in Title VII does not expressly state that
federal jurisdiction shall be exclusive. Id. at 435. The court determined, however, that the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was rebutted because the underlying statute con-
tained references to procedural mechanisms which were available only in the federal system.
Id. at 435-36. In addition, the court stated that although it could find no legislative history
concerning the question of jurisdiction, "the absence of reference to the state courts
combined with Congress's affirmative references to the [district courts of the United States]
suggests an intent to make federal jurisdiction exclusive." Id. at 436. The analysis by the
ninth circuit in Valenzuela is strong indication that the court would conclude in favor of
exclusivity over RICO claims. Therefore, a federal district court in California analogizing
to Valenzuela would likely reach a conclusion different than the California Supreme Court
in Cianci.
80. Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
81. Id. at 1371.
82. Id. See note 35 (discussing RICO's procedural provisions). The Kinsey court noted
that the following provisions were available only in the federal system: 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1963 (West 1984) (criminal prosecutions exclusively federal by unmistakable implication),
1965 (extended venue and process provisions applicable only in federal courts), 1967 (limited
to actions involving the United States), 1968 (only Attorney General may act thereunder).
Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1371. Although the court did not expressly state, a number of the
predicate offenses involve federal crimes which clearly can only be prosecuted in a federal
court.
83. Kinsey, 604 F. Supp. at 1371.
84. See supra note 64 (listing cases addressing RICO jurisdiction question, none
discussing the third Gulf Offshore factor).
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v. Imrex Co.,8S5 affirmed the congressional mandate that RICO's
substantive provisions are to be read broadly to effectuate the
statute's remedial purposes, and rejected attempts by the lower
courts to judicially contain expansive interpretations of the stat-
ute.8 6
In Sedima, the Supreme Court observed that the primary intent
of Congress in enacting RICO was to prevent the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by organized crime. 7 The Court noted an
American Bar Association report which showed that by 1984 only
nine percent of all RICO cases involved allegations of the type of
criminal activities generally associated with professional criminals."
The Court also noted the strong criticism surrounding the almost
exclusive application of RICO against so-called "legitimate" bus-
inesspersons.89 The Sedima majority, however, assented to the
broad interpretation being accorded RICO by the lower courts, and
emphasized that Congress intended that RICO's substantive pro-
visions be read broadly. 90 The Court emphatically stated that any
limitations on the applicability of RICO were for Congress to
make, not the courts. 91
II. THE CASE
In Cianci v. Superior Court,92 the California Supreme Court
applied the United States Supreme Court's broad directive in Se-
dima to RICO's jurisdictional provision.93 Applying the Gulf Off-
85. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
86. Id. at 3286. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (regarding the express
congressional directive for a liberal construction of RICO).
87. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3288 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 23-27
(discussing legislative intent underlying RICO).
88. ABA REPORT, supra note 11, at 55-56.
89. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286-87 & n.16. See also supra notes 11-13 & 40-41 and
accompanying text (concerning criticism of RICO). The Court noted another survey of 132
published decisions in 1984, which found that 57 decisions involved securities transactions
and 38 involved commercial and contract disputes, while no other category made it into
the double figures. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287 n.16 (citing AM. INST. CERT. PUB. ACCT.,
THE AUTHORITY TO BRING PRIVATE TREBLE-DAMAGE SUITS UNDER "RICO" SHOULD BE
REMOVED 13 (Oct. 10, 1984)).
90. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287. But see GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 16 (discussion
of Sedima dissent's narrower interpretation of RICO's legislative history). Indeed, the
Sedima Court's endorsement of the application of RICO means that virtually any com-
mercial dispute can be brought under a RICO charge. Id.
91. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287. "IT]his defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the
statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress." Id.
92. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
93. Id. at 912-13, 710 P.2d at 379, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The Sedima Court, however,
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shore factors to RICO, the Cianci court determined that the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was not rebutted. 94 Of sev-
eral state court opinions addressing the question of jurisdiction
over RICO claims, 95 Cianci is the first case to conclude, based
upon a thorough analysis, that state courts have concurrent juris-
diction.
A. The Facts
Cianci v. Superior Court arose from a dispute between two
groups of doctors over the establishment, funding, and operation
of a hyperbaric medicine96 (HBO) department at a hospital facility. 97
The action was brought by a group of doctors who invested in a
limited partnership formed to buy the equipment for an HBO
department at Brookside Hospital in San Pablo, California.9" The
limited partners filed a complaint against the corporation99 formed
to operate the HBO department, and against the general partners,
Dr. Paul Cianci and Dr. John Poppingo, who were also the
never addressed the question of jurisdiction over RICO claims. On the other hand, the
Sedima Court rejected an opportunity to narrow RICO's scope, and sanctioned the statute's
use against "legitimate" business. In Sedima, the Court reversed, by a five to four vote,
a lower court holding that a plaintiff must plead a racketeering injury in a civil RICO
cause of action. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3277, 3285. The Court also held that there is no
requirement that a RICO treble damage action can proceed only against a defendant who
has already been convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation. Id. at 3277, 3284.
94. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
95. See Main Rusk Assoc. v. Interior Space Constructors, 699 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1985) (exclusive); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d
468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (exclusive); Levinson v. American Accident
Reinsurance Group, 503 A.2d 632 (Del. Ch. 1985) (exclusive); see also Crowson v. Sealaska
Corp., 705 P.2d 905 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1985) (infer exclusivity); Maplewood Bank & Trust
Co. v. Acorn, Inc., 504 A.2d 819 (N.J. Super. Ct., Essex County 1985) (exclusive); but
see LaVay Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 83-1020, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Prince Georges
County, Md. 1984) (concurrent, but only summary analysis of Gulf Offshore).
96. Hyperbaric medicine involves the periodic administration of pure oxygen in a
pressurized chamber, and is the treatment of choice for decompression sickness (commonly
called "the bends"), gas gangrene, carbon monoxide poisoning, and air embolism. Hyper-
baric medicine is also useful as supplementary therapy in the handling of problem wounds
and life-threatening infections, including bum therapy, crushed limbs, and high-risk plastic
surgery. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 907 n.1, 710 P.2d at 376 n.1, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 575 n.1.
97. Id. at 907, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
98. Petition for Hearing on Denial of Writ of Mandate by Court of Appeal (Petitioner),
Cianci v. Superior Court, No. A030875, at 7 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Apr. 15, 1985) (copy on file
at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
99. Ventox, Inc. (Ventox) was the California corporation formed to operate the
hyperbaric medicine department at Brookside under an agreement with the hospital. Dr.
Cianci and Dr. Poppingo owned all Ventox stock equally. Dr. Cianci was the medical
director of the hyperbaric medicine department at Brookside when the action was com-
menced. Id.
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corporation's sole shareholders. 00 The complaint alleged breaches
of fiduciary duty. 10 The limited partners sought a dissolution of
the partnership, an accounting, damages, and impression of a
constructive trust on certain assets of the general partners. 102 Dr.
Cianci filed a cross-complaint against the limited partners, Dr.
Poppingo, and Dr. Poppingo's attorneys. 03 The cross-complaint
alleged, among other things, 1' 4 violations of, and conspiracy to
violate, RICO. 0 5 The RICO action was based upon a letter and
phone calls from Dr. Poppingo's attorney, which Dr. Cianci alleged
was part of a fraudulent scheme to gain control Qf the HBO
department at Brookside Hospital. 1 6
The trial court sustained demurrers to the RICO claims on the
ground that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over RICO
causes of action. 0 7 The California Supreme Court, in a matter of
first impression, 08 concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining
100. Id.
101. Return to Alternative Writ of Mandate (Burns group), Cianci v. Superior Court,
No. 258115, at 9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jun. 1985) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Alternative Writ]. The complaint alleged that the general partners, through Ventox,
took certain funds from the limited partnership and applied them to the creation and
operation of the same hyperbaric medicine department involving the limited partnership.
Thus, the limited partners claimed deprivation of funds which should have gone to the
limited partnership. Id. at 9-10.
102. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
103. Alternative Writ, supra note 101, at 9.
104. The cross-complaint alleged intentional and negligent interference, and conspiracy
to interfere, with the right to practice hyperbaric medicine (the first through sixth causes
of action); violation of, and conspiracy to violate, RICO (the seventh and eighth causes
of action); and conspiracy to violate the Cartwright Act (the ninth cause of action). Cianci,
40 Cal. 3d at 908, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964) (Cartwright Act).
105. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 908, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576. Dr. Cianci was
one of the defendants, a cross-defendant, and a cross-complainant in the case entitled
Burns v. Cianci, No. 258115 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa County 1985). Respondent
was the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, but the Real Parties in Interest consisted
of the following: Dr. Poppingo, a defendant, cross-complainant, and cross-defendant in
the action; one group of limited partners (the Burns group), the plaintiffs and cross-
defendants in the action; and Dr. Poppingo's attorneys (the Berger group), cross-defendants
in the action. Petition, supra note 98, at 4.
106. Petition, supra note 98, at 9; Return to Alternative Writ (Berger group), Cianci
v. Superior Court, No. 258115, at 8-9 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa County 1985) (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal). Dr. Cianci alleged that these communications were for the
purpose of causing Brookside to refrain from entering into a tentative agreement with Dr.
Cianci to continue as medical director of the HBO department, and threatening to sue the
hospital if that agreement was made. Petition, supra note 98, at 9.
107. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 908, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
108. Id. at 908 n.2, 710 P.2d at 376 n.2, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576 n.2. The California
Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to review the trial court's rulings.
Despite a traditional reluctance to employ a prerogative writ to review rulings on pleadings,
the court intervened in the Cianci case because of the significant legal importance and
timeliness of the issues presented. Id.
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the demurrers to the RICO claims. 0 9 The court held that states
have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under RICO. 110
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Mosk,"' the California Supreme
Court ruled that state courts have jurisdiction concurrently with
109. Id. at 908, 710 P.2d at 376, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 576. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the Cartwright claim, stating that the Act does not apply to the medical
profession. The California Supreme Court determined that the trial court had also erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the Cartwright claim, as well as the demurrers to the RICO
claims. Id. at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964), is a state antitrust action prohibiting as
"unlawful, against public policy and void" all trusts as defined by the Act. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 16726 (West 1964). A "trust" is defined for purposes of the Act as "a
combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for" a number of purposes
concerning the restriction of trade or competition. Id. § 16720 (West 1964). Any person
whose business or property is injured by reason of any action forbidden by the Cartwright
Act may sue and recover costs, attorneys' fees, and treble damages. Id. § 16750 (West
1964).
The Cartwright Act does not expressly apply to professions. See generally CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964). In Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n,
the California Supreme Court held that.the exclusion of the word "profession" from the
Cartwright Act evinced the legislature's intent that a profession was not a "trade" within
the meaning of the Act. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 809, 376 P.2d 568, 569-70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640,
641-42 (1962). Thus, the Willis court determined that the Cartwright Act does not apply
to the medical profession. Id. at 809, 376 P.2d at 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The court in
Cianci found no basis for the Willis court's decision to exclude from the Cartwright Act
what the Act does not expressly include. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 921, 710 P.2d at 385, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 585. Since the Cartwright Act broadly prohibits combinations which "might
in any manner" affect the price of any article or commodity, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16720(e)(4) (West 1964), the Cianci court unanimously overruled Willis, concluding that
it would "do violence to such language to limit the applicability of the Act on the ground
that because the professions are not expressly included, they are necessarily excluded." Id.
at 918, 710 P.2d at 383, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
The court further determined that excluding the medical profession would contravene
the whole purpose of the antitrust laws, which is to promote consumer welfare. Id. at 918-
19, 710 P.2d at 383, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The Cianci court thus determined that the
Willis decision was directly opposite to what the legislature intended, finding that the
Cartwright Act's language, purpose, and legislative intent establish that "the [Cartwright]
Act includes what it does not expressly exclude." Id. at 921, 710 P.2d at 385, 221 Cal.
Rptr. at 585. Furthermore, the court adopted the reasoning in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court determined that the
legal profession was not excluded from the antitrust regulation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
See Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 710 P.2d at 384-85, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85. The Cianci
court noted that the conclusion in Goldfarb was based upon the intent of Congress for §
I of the Sherman Act to be applied as broadly as possible, and because § 1 contained no
express exception for the legal profession. Id. at 920, 710 P.2d at 384-85, 221 Cal. Rptr.
at 584. Applying a similar analysis, the Cianci court held that "neither the nature of a
profession nor its public service aspect is sufficient to exclude [the medical profession]
from the reach of the antitrust laws." Id. at 920-21, 710 P.2d at 385, 221 Cal. Rptr. at
584-85. Any profession or business not expressly exempted in the statute thus should fall
within the coverage of the Cartwright Act.
110. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
111. Justice Lucas and Justice Grodin dissented regarding the determination of juris-
diction over RICO causes of action. Id. at 925, 710 P.2d at 388, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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federal courts over claims arising under RICO. 12 The decision of
the court was based upon an analysis of the Gulf Offshore fac-
tors. 13 First, the court examined whether RICO explicitly conferred
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. 114 Second, the legislative
history of RICO was reviewed to determine whether exclusivejurisdiction was unmistakably implied." 5 Finally, the court dis-
cussed whether state court jurisdiction was clearly incompatible
with the federal interests involved. 1 6
1. Silence of Section 1964(c)
The Cianci court observed that the language of RICO's jurisdic-
tional provision does not explicitly limit jurisdiction to the federal
courts." 7 Section 1964(c) of RICO does not state, nor even suggest,
that jurisdiction over RICO claims shotild be exclusive." 8 Section
1964(c) merely provides that RICO claims "may" be brought in a
United States district court." 9 Moreover, the court noted, as did
the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore, that the mere
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts does not deprive a state
court from hearing the matter.' 20 The court thus found that the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was not rebutted by the
first Gulf Offshore factor, the explicit wording of the statute.' 2,
2. Lack of Congressional Intent
The majority next analyzed the legislative history behind RICO
to determine if Congress unmistakably intended section 1964(c) to
confer exclusive jurisdiction. The Cianci court acknowledged that
two federal district courts had concluded in favor of exclusive
112. Id. at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
113. See id. at 909-16, 710 P.2d at 377-82, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577-82.
114. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
117. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
118. Id. See also supra note 63 and accompanying text (statement by principal draftsman
of RICO that Congress did not consider the question of jurisdiction when enacting RICO).
119. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See also supra
note 65 (language of jurisdictional provision).
120. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910-11, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See also
supra note 54 and accompanying text (United States Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore Oil
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), discussing effect of mere grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts).
121. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 910-11, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
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federal jurisdiction over RICO claims. 122 The majority rejected the
reasoning of the decision in County of Cook v. Midcon Corp.123
as superficial, stating that the analogy to an antitrust prototype
falls short of establishing an unmistakable implication that Con-
gress intended exclusive jurisdiction over RICO claims. 124 The ma-
jority opinion also determined that the Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration
Ltd.-1981A' 25 decision had read the statute too narrowly in deter-
mining that the reliance of RICO on federal procedural devices
showed an unmistakable congressional intent to limit jurisdiction
to the federal courts. 26 In addition, the Cianci majority concluded
that the Kinsey result contradicted the subsequent United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 27
The Cianci court determined that Congress unmistakably in-
tended that section 1964(c) be liberally construed to effectuate the
statute's remedial purposes. 28 The court noted that in Sedima, the
United States Supreme Court had declined to limit the scope of
RICO's substantive provisions, in part because narrowing RICO's
substantive provisions would create inappropriate and unnecessary
obstacles in the way of a private litigant. 2 9 The Cianci court
122. Id. at 911, 914 n.3, 710 P.2d at 378 n.3, 380, 221 Cal. Rptr. 578, 580 n.3.
123. 574 F. Supp. 902 (1983), aff'd, 773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985).
124. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 911, 710 P.2d at 378, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See supra notes
71-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Midcon). The majority's analysis regarding the
similarity of RICO and Clayton Act provisions is similar to that of a federal district court.
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1983),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Nathan,
supra note 11, at 356 (discussing State Farm, and the use of antitrust precedent in RICO
interpretation). The court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton held that
while the death of a wrongdoer would abate a treble damage remedy under the antitrust
laws, it did not abate a treble damage claim under civil RICO. State Farm, 540 F. Supp.
at 682. The court stated that RICO was "cast as a separate statute intentionally to avoid
the restrictive precedent of antitrust jurisprudence." Id. at 680. The State Farm court
concluded that "to burden RICO with restrictive antitrust precedents would be contrary
to the express legislative history." Id. However, the congressional motivation for enacting
a separate statute from the Clayton Act is far from clear, since Congress utilized the same
language for civil RICO that had been used in the Clayton Act, and since the legislative
history repeatedly indicates that the antitrust case law would be available to guide the
interpretation of RICO. Nathan, supra note 11, at 356-57. Some experts, therefore, are of
the opinion that antitrust precedent should guide the interpretation of RICO's provisions.
Id. at 358. See also notes 71-76 and accompanying text (Midcon court's analysis of this
issue).
125. 604 F. Supp. 1365 (1985).
126. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 914 n.3, 710 P.2d at 380 n.3, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580 n.3. See
supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussion of Kinsey).
127. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 914 n.3, 710 P.2d at 380 n.3, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580 n.3. See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
128. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 912, 710 P.2d at 379, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
129. Id.
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deduced that exclusive jurisdiction would similarly create an inap-
propriate obstacle for RICO plaintiffs by barring an injured party
from seeking redress in a convenient forum. 130 Because there was
no evidence sufficient to imply that Congress unmistakably intended
exclusive jurisdiction over RICO claims, the majority concluded
that the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was not rebutted
by the second Gulf Offshore factor.13 1
3. Minimal Incompatibility Between Federal Interests and
State Court Jurisdiction
Finally, the majority looked at whether state court jurisdiction
would be "clearly incompatible" with the federal interests involved
in RICO. To establish "clear incompatibility" under Gulf Offshore,
the Cianci court had to consider the desirability of uniform inter-
pretation of RICO, the expertise of federal judges in RICO cases,
and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to RICO as
a distinctively federal claim.1 32 First, the majority concluded that
the congressional goal of uniformity in the interpretation of RICO
would not be frustrated by concurrent jurisdiction. 3  The court
declared that the scope of three out of the four elements 134 com-
prising a RICO violation are "indisputably detailed and clear"
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sedima. 135
Although the Cianci court acknowledged that the scope of the
remaining element 3 6 was somewhat amorphous, the court expressed
confidence that the statute's legislative history would adequately
limit state court expansion of RICO. 137
130. Id.
131. Id. at 912-14, 710 P.2d at 378-80, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 578-80.
132. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing Gulf Offshore "clear
incompatibility" factors).
133. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 914, 710 P.2d at 380, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580. See supra note
57 and accompanying text (discussion of the first Gulf Offshore incompatibility consider-
ation, the need for uniformity in interpretation).
134. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The elements
comprising a RICO violation are (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) constituting a pattern,
(4) of racketeering activity. See supra note 26 (elements of RICO cause of action). The
elements which the Cianci court declared were "unambiguous" after the United States
Supreme Court's Sedima decision are "conduct," "of an enterprise," and "of racketeering
activity." Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
135. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
136. See supra note 134 (pattern).
137. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81. But see infra
note 227 (definition of pattern still uncertain); infra notes 225-30 (discussion of how state
court judges may well expand upon existing federal law).
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The second Gulf Offshore consideration, that RICO requires the
expertise of federal judges, was also resolved in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction.'38 The majority observed that state courts are well
equipped to handle RICO cases since the statute's list of predicate
offenses includes state law violations. 139 A state court judge, there-
fore, should have an understanding of RICO comparable to that
of a federal court judge. 140 Because a RICO cause of action can
be based upon a violation of state law, the court also rejected the
final Gulf Offshore consideration, that state judges will be more
hostile to RICO claims than will federal judges. 4 1 The court thus
concluded that the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was not
rebutted by showing a clear incompatability between state court
jurisdiction and federal interests. 42
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Lucas, 143 followed the
analysis of both the Kinsey and Midcon courts, and concluded that
Congress unmistakably intended to restrict jurisdiction over RICO
claims solely to the federal courts.1" The dissent first agreed with
the district court in Midcon that the striking similarity between
section 1964(c) of RICO and section 4 of the Clayton Act dem-
onstrated that Congress purposefully modeled the two jurisdictional
provisions after one another.1 45 The dissent observed that the courts
have uniformly held that section 4 of the Clayton Act confers
exclusive jurisdiction. 46 Because of the striking similarity of section
138. Id. at 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text (discussion of the second Gulf Offshore incompatibility consideration).
139. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d 915, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The court observed
that 23 states have already enacted "little RICO" state statutes, and 6 additional states
have such statutes pending. Id. at 916, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186-186.8 (West 1970). Many of these "little RICO" state statutes
also provide civil remedies, including injunctive relief. State RICO statutes have already
been frequently used. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
140. See Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 916, 710 P.2d at 381, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581. "While
federal judges must be presumed to have greater expertise over [federal law violations],
state judges must be presumed to have greater expertise over the state violation." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 916, 710 P.2d at 382, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
143. See supra note 11l (Lucas, J., joined by Grodin, J.).
144. See Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 925-26 & n.1, 710 P.2d at 388 & n.1, 221 Cal. Rptr. at
588 & n.1 (dissent noting that the courts in Midcon, Kinsey, and Greenview held in favor
of exclusive jurisdiction).
145. Id. at 926, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589. See supra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text (discussion of Midcon court analysis).
146. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 926, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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4 of the Clayton Act and RICO's jurisdictional provision, Justice
Lucas concluded that the Midcon court's analysis was correct, and
that Congress unmistakably implicated exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. 47
Justice Lucas also determined that the majority had improperly
focused on the predicate offenses when establishing congressional
intent.1 48 The Kinsey court's concentration on the overall statutory
scheme was, in the dissent's opinion, the proper focus. 49 Lucas
observed that Congress did not enact RICO for the purpose of
imposing federal liability for state business fraud claims. 150 He
noted that the overall objective of RICO primarily focused on
organized crime.'-" Justice Lucas further stated that RICO was
enacted to prevent and punish wide reaching criminal schemes
affecting interstate commerce.- 2 According to this analysis, the
concentration on interstate commerce exhibits the congressional
intent that RICO have a broad, interstate application, thus indi-
cating the need to restrict RICO jurisdiction to the federal courts.' 53
The dissent also argued that the procedural powers necessary to
implement the statute's objectives are reserved exclusively to the
federal courts. 54 For example, Justice Lucas noted that section
1965 of RICO provides extended venue and process provisions
applicable only in federal courts. 5 He observed that Congress does
not, however, have the ability to similarly extend the jurisdictional
reach of state courts. 56 By extending the procedural powers of
federal courts, and by using federal definitions as a substantive
part of RICO, the dissent followed Kinsey in concluding that
Congress "unmistakably intended" that RICO causes of action
could only be brought in the federal courts. 157
147. Id.
148. Id. at 928, 710 P.2d at 390, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
149. Id. at 927, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589. See supra notes 77-83 and
accompanying text (discussion of Kinsey court analysis).
150. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 927, 710 P.2d at 390, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (quoting Seville
Indus. Mach. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (D.C.N.J. 1983)).
151. Id. at 927, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589. See supra notes 23-32 and
accompanying text (discussion of RICO's primary goal).
152. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 928, 710 P.2d at 390, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See supra notes
85-91 and accompanying text (Sedima Court's discussion of congressional intent).
153. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 928, 710 P.2d at 390, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
154. Id. at 927, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
155. Id. at 927, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
156. Id. at 928, 710 P.2d at 390, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
157. Id. at 929, 710 P.2d at 391, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See also supra notes 77-83 and
accompanying text (discussion of Kinsey court analysis); supra note 79 (discussion of the
ninth circuit's analysis of jurisdiction issue concerning Title VII cases).
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Justice Lucas concluded that the third Gulf Offshore factor, the
incompatibility between federal interests and state court jurisdic-
tion, also rebutted the usual presumption in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction. 58 Lucas asserted that the complexity of RICO itself
gravitates toward federal exclusivity.- 9 Although federal courts
have been hearing RICO cases since the statute's inception in 1970,
Lucas noted that the federal courts are divided over interpretations
of RICO. 60 He observed that permitting concurrent jurisdiction
would only bring state courts into the already divided area of RICO
interpretation.' 6' Expansion of jurisdiction could therefore, in the
dissent's view, result in even more variant interpretations and
unintended uses of the statute. 62 In addition, Lucas observed that
since many of the predicate offenses which may constitute a RICO
violation include federal law, state courts will often need to inter-
pret federal statutes when deciding disputes involving a RICO cause
of action. 63 The dissent argued that federal courts are far more
familiar with the interpretation of federal law than are state courts. 16
According to the Lucas analysis, the federal interests involved are
therefore "clearly incompatible" with state court jurisdiction.
Justice Lucas asserted an additional policy consideration favoring
exclusive jurisdiction. Because most of the RICO civil actions are
asserted against "legitimate" businesspersons, the stigma of being
labeled a "racketeer" may create an incentive to settle RICO
cases. 165 Lucas also speculated that the imposition of treble damages
for a RICO violation creates a strong incentive for settlement of
even meritless cases, since the federal courts are in conflict over
the scope of the statute's substantive provisions. 66 Incentives to
settle, in the dissent's opinion, can only increase if state court
decisions are added to already conflicting federal court decisions. 167
Thus, Justice Lucas concluded that concurrent jurisdiction may
158. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 926, 710 P.2d at 389, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
159. Id. at 929, 710 P.2d at 391, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
160. See id. at 929 n.6, 710 P.2d at 391 n.6, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591 n.6 (examples of
issues where federal courts are split). See also infra note 227 (further examples of uncertain
areas).
161. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 930, 710 P.2d at 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
162. Id.
163. Id. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing predicate acts).
164. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 930, 710 P.2d at 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
165. Id. See supra notes 11-13, 34 & 40-41, and accompanying text; infra note 232 and
accompanying text (use of RICO's assertion against so-called "legitimate" businesses).
166. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 930, 710 P.2d at 391-92, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
167. Id. at 930, 710 P.2d at 392, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
1289
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
enhance RICO's use for the same sort of extortion the statute was
designed to attack.1 68
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Besides the procedural advantages inherent in a RICO cause of
action, 169 an attorney may believe that bringing a client's RICO
action in state court increases the chances of success. 170 For ex-
ample, an attorney may wish to avoid bringing a case in federal
court because of the heightened formality and enhanced possibilty
of sanctions for inadequate legal analysis.' 7 1 The availability of a
state court system as the forum ultimately can be the difference
between winning and losing a RICO case.1 72 The ruling of the
California Supreme Court in Cianci v. Superior Court in favor of
concurrent jurisdiction permits the attorney to bring a client's RICO
cause of action in state court to take advantage of the more
favorably perceived state forum. 173 Moreover, the potential positive
ramifications of bringing a RICO cause of action in state court
extend to both the procedural and substantive law areas involved.
7
"
168. Id. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (discussing the use of concurrent
jurisdiction as an additional means to coerce settlement of RICO claims).
169. See supra notes 35 & 82 (RICO's procedural provisions). RICO contains several
procedural rules that may impact significantly on the viability of a RICO cause of action.
Sections 1965-1968 contain liberal procedural provisions, including extended personal ju-
risdiction and venue provisions. See id. Most courts have determined that a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard applies, even when a criminal prosecution of the same predicate
offense would require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." GumE To RICO, supra note
8, at 13. Indeed, although the United States Supreme Court declined to rule on the burden
of proof question, the Court indicated that a "preponderance test" seemed proper. Id.
(citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282 (1985)).
RICO does not specify a statute of limitations for civil actions. The approach accepted
by most courts is to look to the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. The
question of what statute of limitations should apply to civil actions, however, is unsettled.
Id.
When a RICO cause of action is brought in federal court, parties are entitled to the
broad discovery rights of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Conceivably, a defendant
could be exposed to pretrial discovery concerning every aspect of its business over a 10
year period. Id. at 14. However, whether Congress has the constitutional power to require
state courts to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unclear. Valenzuela v. Kraft,
739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984).
170. See Kirsch, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting one attorney as follows: "We find that
about 90 percent of our cases are brought in state court ... while 10 years ago more than
half were brought in federal court.").
171. Id. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (discussing the "black robe"
factor for avoiding federal court).
172. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 31.
173. See supra note 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing concurrent jurisdiction).
174. See infra notes 177-209 and accompanying text (discussion of procedural advan-
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The advent of concurrent jurisdiction, however, also brings poten-
tial negative ramifications. Concurrent jurisdiction may cause the
expansion of federal laws.175 Further, the uncertainty which exists
concerning RICO's scope of application may also result in the
statute's increased use as a device to coerce settlement of meritless
cases. 
176
A. Potential Positive Ramifications of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The following discussion is not intended to set forth an exhaustive
list of the differences between the two court systems, but merely
to provide factors which might influence an attorney contemplating
a RICO cause of action to file his action in state court.
1. The Doe Factor
Procedural differences between the state and federal court sys-
tems are numerous. 77 For example, federal law does not permit
the use of "Does," or other fictitious defendants.178 Moreover, all
defendants must be named and served with process prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. 79 Under California law, a
defendant not only may be named a "Doe" defendant, but may
also be served with process up to three years after the action has
been filed, even though the statute of limitations has expired.'8 0
Thus, while the attorney in federal court may be prohibited from
adding a defendant, the attorney may be able to add that same
"Doe" defendant in a state court proceeding.
tages); infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (discussion of substantive advantages).
See also Redish & Muench, supra note 43, at 334. These positive ramifications may also
be practical in effect. If the number of RICO claims begin to inundate the federal court
system, concurrent jurisdiction would allow a distribution of the projected case load among
the federal and state judicial systems. Id. See also infra note 231 and accompanying text
(discussing potential flood of RICO litigation). Concurrent jurisdiction could therefore do
much to alleviate the overload within the federal judiciary. Redish & Muench, supra note
43, at 334. In addition, situations may arise where, for the convenience of the parties, the
number of available forums should be increased. Id.
175. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (discussing potential federal law
expansion).
176. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (discussing RICO an incentive to
settle).
177. See generally Kirsch, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing primary differences between
federal and state court).
178. See id. at 34 (discussing the federal rule, but stating that a recent ninth circuit
decision, Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2926 (1986), suggests California's rule applies in a diversity action).
179. See id. (discussing the federal rule).
180. See id. (discussing the California rule).
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2. The Money Factor
The decision to bring suit in either the state or federal system
can also have a dramatic effect upon the cost of the litigation.' 8'
All federal cases filed in California must be tried in one of the
five district courts located in either San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Sacramento, San Diego, or Fresno.182 Litigation in state court may
be far more convenient and less expensive for litigants, attorneys,
and witnesses who live outside one of the few cities with federal
courthouses. 83 Further, an attorney too far from a federal court
city may prefer to empanel a jury consisting of local residents. 84
3. The Black Robe Factor
An attorney may prefer to file a client's action in state court
because of the effect a particular state or federal judge may have
upon various aspects of the litigation. 85 The federal courts are
administered under a "single-judge" system. Cases are generally
assigned to one judge who presides over each aspect of the case,
including discovery, law and motion proceedings, settlement con-
ferences, applications for emergency relief, and the trial itself. 18 6
A federal judge is therefore familiar with the status of each case
on his or her docket. Moreover, the judge has a vested interest in
the prompt resolution of each case in his or her docket, in order
to avoid a large backlog of cases. 87
State courts, on the other hand, are administered under a "mul-
tijudge" system. Cases filed in state court are usually placed on a
master calendar, under which judges do not have to control their
own docket of cases. 188 Moreover, each aspect of a case filed in
state court, such as discovery, law and motion proceedings, settle-
ment conferences, and trial, is usually heard by a different judge. 8 9
Thus, state court judges may have less of an interest than their




185. Id. at 32-33; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
186. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
187. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
188. Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
189. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32.
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federal counterparts in the case as a whole. 19 For example, pretrial
motions are heard by a Law and Motion judge, who frequently
has thirty or more motions on his or her daily calendar, and usually
has fewer clerks to help with this accumulation than a federal court
judge.19' As a result, many practitioners believe the chance of a
case surviving pretrial motions to dismiss are much higher in state
court than in federal court. 92
If the case survives pretrial motions to dismiss, the "black robe"
factor can also affect the odds for surviving motions to dismiss
during the trial. 93 A state court judge ordinarily is not assigned to
try the case until the first day of trial, but the same federal court
judge presiding over pretrial matters remains as the trial judge. 194
Moreover, while a state court judge can be removed from trying a
case by a peremptory challenge,1 95 no similar rule for mandatory
removal is provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 96
Thus, many practitioners believe the chances are also much better
in state court for surviving motions to dismiss during trial. 97
Finally, the amount of control an individual judge exerts upon
a case can drastically affect both the attorney and client. The
attorney may view jury selection as a crucial opportunity to fa-
miliarize the jury with both the attorney and the case. 98 In state
court, the attorney conducts voir dire. 99 In federal court, however,
voir dire is conducted by the judge.200 Federal courts also are
perceived to have a heightened formality, and are so rulebound
that an attorney often becomes inundated with paperwork. 20 1 Be-
cause of the heightened formality, federal court judges also tend
to be much more abrupt and terse with an attorney than state
court judges, and federal judges have a greater tendency to impose
financial sanctions upon attorneys and their clients for frivolous
motions and discovery abuses. 20 2 Thus, to increase their control
190. Id.
191. Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
192. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
193. Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
194. Id.; Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32.
195. See CAL. Crw. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 1982).
196. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32.
197. Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
198. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 32.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 32-33.
202. Id. See also Adams & Nolin, Pretrial Abuses Now Punished by U.S. Courts, Nat'l
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over trial matters and to lessen the chance of sanctions, attorneys
may prefer to take advantage of concurrent jurisdicton and file
their action in a state court. 203
4. The Jury Box Factor
Many attorneys favor having their case heard by a state court
jury as opposed to a jury in federal court. 20 4 Federal courts in
California empanel only six jurors, and a unanimous jury verdict
L.J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 15 (discussing increase in federal court sanctioning of attorneys
and clients for pretrial abuses). Congress amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1980 and 1983 to encourage courts to address the problem of pretrial abuse which was
rampant during the 1970s and early 1980s, but for which federal court judges were
apparently reluctant to impose sanctions. Shaffer, Rule 11 and the Prefiling Duty, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 28; Adams & Nolin, supra, at 15. Currently, at least six rules
contain sanction provisions to control pretrial abuses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26, 30,
37 & 45. See also Dombroff, Attorneys in Affirmed Pleadings Risk Sanctions, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 27, 1986, at 15; Shaffer, supra, at 28 (both discussing the background, requirements,
and impact of Rule 11). Cf. id. (citing Pravic v. United States Indus. Clearing, 109 F.R.D.
620 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (Rule 11 sanctions levied against an attorney who failed to confirm
a legal opinion he had received from other counsel)). Rules allowing a party to seek
recourse when deposition abuse occurs add to the reluctance of an attorney to bring an
action in the federal system. See Adams & Nolin, supra, at 15; FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 37 &
45. Under Rule 37, sanctions can be awarded for inadvertent failures to comply with a
court's directive regarding a deposition. Adams & Nolin, supra, at 15. Rule 26(g), con-
cerning discovery requests, gives the judge a great deal of flexibility to impose sanctions,
permitting the imposition of sanctions without an existing order compelling behavior, and
even in the absence of a motion for sanctions. Rule 26(g) sanctions can even be imposed
where the bulk of the discovery requests are simply out of proportion to the case. Id.
Moreover, the express language of the rule does not limit the sanctions available. See Id.
(Rule 26(g) specifies only an "appropriate sanction"). Rule 26(g) sanctions also appear to
be mandatory once a violation of the rule occurs. Thus, the reluctance of federal judges
to impose sanctions for pretrial misconduct has greatly decreased. Shaffer, supra, at 28.
A recent study by the Federal Judicial Council indicates that federal judges are more
willing than previously to sanction lawyers for insufficient prefiling inquiry. Id. An attorney
may therefore feel that bringing a client's action in state court will lessen the chance of
sanctions.
203. California, however, has recently overhauled its discovery provisions by the Civil
Discovery Act of 1986 (hereinafter Discovery Act), the effective date of which is July 1,
1987. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West Supp. 1987). The Discovery Act
makes a number of changes which might affect an attorney's choice between state and
federal courts, including changes in the general scope of discovery, work product protection,
oral and written deposition use, interrogatory use, physical and mental examinations,
requests for admissions, exchange of expert witness information, and stipulations. See
generally Review of Selected 1986 California Legislation, 18 PAc. L.J. 500 (1987) (in depth
analysis of the new Discovery Act) [hereinafter cited as Review of 1986 Legislation]. The
objective of the procedural changes appears to be to prevent discovery abuse, rather than
to increase sanctions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2030(c)(1), (3), (5), 2030(k)
(West Supp. 1987) (Discovery Act provisions regarding interrogatories). See also Review
of 1986 Legislation, supra, at 514-19 (discussing Discovery Act's interrogatory provisions
including sanction provisions).
204. Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
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is required. 20 5 Further, attorneys litigating in federal court are not
permitted to approach the jury during opening statements, exami-
nation of witnesses, or closing arguments.2 0 6 California courts,
however, empanel twelve-member juries, and require only a three-
fourths majority to prevail. 20 7 Attorneys litigating in a California
court can also lean on the rail of the jury box if they so desire. 20 8
Many attorneys believe that the composition of state court jury
panels and the greater informality of state courts generally tend to
favor the plaintiff's case, and can actually enhance a jury verdict. 2 9
5. The Expansion Factor
The choice between the state and federal systems may prove
especially valuable when attorneys seek to have a judge or jury
apply RICO's substantive provisions to a particular factual situa-
tion. A RICO cause of action can be based upon any number of
violations of state law.210 State court judges are far more familiar
with the law of their own jurisdictions than are federal court
judges. 21' Familiarity with state law means that it will be applied
more often. 21 2 State judges may therefore be more expansive in
applying state law in close cases. 21" This "expansion factor" of
state court jurisdiction over RICO claims may prove invaluable to
a RICO plaintiff asserting his or her claim in a situation when the
attorney is unsure whether a RICO violation has been committed.
214
B. Potential Negative Ramifications of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Although the ability to choose between the federal and state
systems presents an attorney with several possible advantages, con-
205. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 34; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
206. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 34.
207. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 34; RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238.
208. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 34.
209. Id. at 34-35; Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238. Other attorneys, however,
feel that the heightened formality of federal court increases the jury's sensitivity to the
seriousness of the matter, and that enhanced jury awareness can result in an enhanced jury
verdict. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 35.
210. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussion of predicate offenses
upon which a RICO claim may be based).
211. Kirsch, supra note 1, at 33.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. But see Kirsch, supra note 1, at 33. At least one California attorney, however,
believes that a RICO plaintiff should bring his claim in federal court because state judges
are unfamiliar, skeptical, and uncomfortable with RICO. Id.
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current jurisdiction also presents potential negative legal ramifica-
tions. Concurrent jurisdiction may create a trap for unwary plaintiffs
and their attorneys. 21 5 Federal substantive law may also be unin-
tentionally expanded by state court judges deciding RICO causes
of action.216 Finally, concurrent jurisdiction may enhance the use
of RICO for purposes of extortion, a consequence which the statute
was originally designed to prevent. 21 7
1. Trap for Unwary Plaintiffs
The federal courts have been hearing RICO cases since the
statute's inception in 1970, and therefore have far more experience
with RICO litigation than state courts. 218 State courts, however,
are not bound by the decisions of the federal district or appellate
courts when deciding state substantive law, which comprise several
of the predicate offenses upon which a RICO cause of action may
be based. 21 9 A state court may therefore decide that a RICO
violation has occurred in a situation in which a federal court judge
has already denied the assertion of RICO.
The risk that concurrent jurisdiction will adversely affect a
defendant is minimized by federal procedural rules. If a RICO
defendant perceives that his chances of successfully defending against
the lawsuit are enhanced in a federal court, the defendant can
simply remove the plaintiff's action to a federal court. 220 Thus,
215. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
218. Redish & Muench, supra note 43, at 330.
219. See id. at 319. There is, however, a well established principle that state courts are
obligated to enforce applicable principles of federal law when deciding state causes of
action. This principle is based upon the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2. Nevertheless, a court could conceivably draft a decision
professing to follow the legislative intent behind RICO, yet deciding the state law issue
contrary to an existing federal decision, or in a factual circumstance where the federal
courts have not addressed.
220. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441. Subsection (a) of § 1441 provides as follows: "Except as
otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant." Thus, only the defendant can remove a case from state to federal court. IA
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168[3.-2-2], at 547 (2d ed. 1933). To return to state court,
the plaintiff would need to have the RICO claims dismissed, and dismissal would require
the court's permission if the defendant already had filed responsive pleadings. Civil RICO
Claims, supra note 40, at 238-39. See FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a), 41(a). Even if the plaintiff
properly amends his complaint so that his claim is then based solely on a nonfederal
matter, the general rule is that the federal court should retain jurisdiction over the matter.
Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 239. See IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.16017],
at 246 (2d ed. 1983).
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Cianci may be a trap for an unwary plaintiff's counsel who wants
to add a RICO treble damages claim to a non-RICO fraud claim
based upon state law.2 2' Instead of being afforded the benefits of
state court, the plaintiff may unexpectedly have to litigate in federal
court . 2
Further, a plaintiff who brings his non-RICO action in state
court may find that the defendent has filed a counter-claim alleging
a RICO violation based upon either mail or wire fraud.223 The non-
RICO plaintiff may prefer that a federal court judge resolve the
RICO dispute because of the increased chance that a state court
judge will find a RICO violation. 224 Only the defendant, however,
can remove the action to federal court.225 The non-RICO plaintiff
might find that concurrent jurisdiction may therefore create a trap
for unwary plaintiffs.
2. Expansion Of Federal Law
Concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims may result in the
expansion of federal laws. The resolution of a RICO claim may
depend upon the state court's interpretation of federal substantive
law as the predicate offense upon which the RICO cause of action
is based. 226 Numerous issues involving the interpretation of RICO's
provisions remain ambiguous after Sedima.2 7 Even if a state court
221. See Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 238 ("Cianci may be a trap for unwary
plaintiffs").
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text (discussion of Cianci case, in
which plaintiff brought non-RICO claims and defendant cross-complained a RICO cause
of action).
224. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (discussing how state court judges
may be more expansive in applying the law in close cases).
225. See supra note 220 (concerning removal).
226. Id. See also supra note 36 (predicate offenses include both state and federal
substantive law).
227. At least one of the essential elements in establishing a RICO cause of action is
unclear. Presently, a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
"racketeering activity" within 10 years of each other to establish the requisite "pattern."
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West 1976). The United States Supreme Court, in a footnote in
Sedima, suggested that two isolated acts may not necessarily suffice to establish a "pattern."
GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct.
3275, 3285 n.14 (1985)). Nevertheless, the lower federal courts are divided concerning a
more narrow construction of the pattern requirement. Id. at 8. Section 1962(a) of RICO
prohibits the use of income derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire
a financial interest in an enterprise. GumE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 8. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1962(a) (West 1984). Whether the "person" and the "enterprise" in a RICO action
brought under section 1962(a) can constitute the same entity is unclear. GUIDE To RICO, supra
note 8, at 9. The question of what statute of limitations applies to civil RICO actions is
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judge bases his decision upon marginal or unpersuasive authority,
the federal system may be unable to overturn the extension of
federal law. If the state court decision was based on independent
and adequate state grounds, the Supreme Court is precluded from
deciding the correctness of a state court's rulings on issues of state
law simply because those issues arise in a case that also raises
federal questions .22 Therefore, if a state judge found that a RICO
defendant violated two state law predicate offenses and one federal
law predicate offense, the state law ruling would be sufficiently
broad to support the state court's judgment. 229 The United States
Supreme Court would thus lack jurisdiction to review the judgment,
regardless of the correctness of the state court's resolution of the
RICO cause of action. 230 The potential for state expansion of
federal law would therefore be magnified if the advent of concur-
rent jurisdiction results in a flood of RICO cases being brought in
state court. 23'
3. Incentive for Settlement
The potential for the expansion of RICO by state court inter-
pretations may also result in the statute's increased use as an
likewise complex and unsettled. Id. at 13. Further, although the Sedima majority indicated
that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard would apply to civil RICO actions, some
commentators have suggested that, because of the heavy penalties provided in section 1964,
a higher burden of proof should govern RICO actions. Id. at 13.




231. See Civil RICO Claims, supra note 40, at 237-38 (noting criticism of a potential
flood of litigation, but stating that criticism may be unfounded); Lauter, Report Says
Litigation Explosion Is a "Myth," Nat'l L.J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 46 (stating that litigation
in most states has declined in recent years). But see Marvell, There Is a Litigation Explosion,
Nat'l L.J., May 19, 1986, at 13 (predicting a very large increase in future caseloads). Even
if litigation as a whole is decreasing, many experts assert that RICO suits will soon flood
the courts without meaningful RICO reform by either Congress or the courts. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 12, at 30 (RICO flood unless meaningful reform). See also Lauter
& Strasser, supra note 11, at S-9 (some federal judges estimate that as many as 10% of
the civil filings they see contain RICO counts); Galen, supra note 11, at 26 (accounting
firms already deluged with RICO suits and Sedima will allow more); Ginger, supra note
11, at 179 (federal courts have been flooded recently with RICO claims); GuIDe To RICO,
supra note 8, at 21 (Sedima decision "has opened the proverbial floodgates and a torrent
of 'garden-variety fraud' cases alleging RICO violations will soon follow."); Kennedy,
supra note 11, at 465 ("Sedima opened the floodgates for an ever-increasing number of
civil RICO suits."). On the other hand, Professor Blakey, the chief author of RICO in its
present form, takes a contrary view. See Pro-Victim, supra note 11, at 25. He asserts that
the number of RICO claims will eventually settle somewhere between the current amount
of antitrust and securities litigation. Thus, Blakey claims that the total volume of RICO
suits will be well below other major areas of litigation. Id.
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incentive for settlement, 23 2 RICO is a vague area of the law. 233 The
more vague an area of the law is, the greater the chance that the
law will be found to apply to a specific factual situation.234 The
chances of application are enhanced by the United States Supreme
Court's mandate in Sedima, that RICO's substantive provisions are
to be interpreted broadly. 235 The incentive to settle a RICO claim
becomes quite high, if one adds to the above factors, the potential
for a treble damage award and the stigmatization of the RICO
defendant as a "racketeer. '2 6
232. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (Cianci dissent's discussion of the
potential coercive settlement problem). See also supra notes 11-13 & 40-41 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the apparent misuse of the statute). Numerous authors have noted
either some or all of the following factors as creating a high prospect that a RICO cause
of action will be settled: (1) the reinforcement of a broad construction of RICO's substantive
provisions by the Supreme Court in Sedima, (2) the possibility of obtaining treble damages
and recovering attorneys' fees, (3) the added leverage a plaintiff obtains by threatening the
prospect of a jury finding that the defendant is a "racketeer," and (4) only having to
satisfy a "preponderance of the evidence test" to establish predicate offenses, such as
mail and wire fraud, which occur frequently as misrepresentations while conductng normal
business activities. See Lauter & Strasser, supra note 11, at S-9; Field & Wyeth, Federal
Acts Put Attorneys at Risk for Giving Clients Routine Advice, Nat'l L.J., June 16, 1986,
at 30; RICO Crisis, supra note 11, at 31; O'Brien, supra note 41, at F2; Anderson, supra
note 11, at 22, 28. The factors noted above have also caused detrimental impacts on the
commercial markets. O'Brien, supra note 41, at F2 (RICO has had a particularly acute
impact in the securities industry). See also Galen, supra note 11, at 26-27 (showing similar
impact on accounting industry, and resulting difficulty in obtaining insurance). An infor-
mation survey conducted by the Securities Industry Association revealed that 143 brokerage
companies reported that some 406 RICO cases are pending in federal court, and that the
actual number is far greater. For example, despite a purported strong defense, a company
decided to settle for $85,000 more than the amount of trading losses alleged, rather than
risk losing $600,000, plus $50,000 in attorney's fees. See id. at 27 (both attorneys and
accountants say that virtually all securities cases brought today include a RICO claim).
Moreover, claims under many securities law provisions are difficult to dispose of by
dismissal or summary judgment. Thus, a RICO claim, with allegations of securities fraud
as the predicate offenses, further increases the likelihood of settlement. Field & Wyeth,
supra, at 30. Two experts in the insurance industry advocate the use of RICO causes of
action if concurrent jurisdiction is recognized. Fielkow & Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 24-
25. They suggest that "insurance counsel may consider using RICO in the form of a
counterclaim when an insurer is sued by an insured in state court for nonpayment of the
claim." Id. at 24. Thus, "an insured and perhaps counsel may think twice about proceeding
with the suit against the insurer where the insured need be concerned with defending a
RICO counterclaim .. . . This is especially true when, as is often the case, insured's
counsel is handling the litigation against the insurer on a contingent fee basis." Id. at 25.
This advocacy by the commercial markets should signal Congress of the alarming potential
for further misuse of RICO.
233. See supra note 227 (noting some of the ambiquous areas).
234. See id.
235. See supra notes 39 & 85-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Sedima, and
broad RICO construction mandate).
236. An additional inherent problem with RICO is the intangible factor that the RICO
defendant is characterized as a "racketeer." Nathan, supra note 11, at 342. See also supra
notes 11-13, 40-41 & 232 (discussing RICO as an inherent incentive to settle); but see Pro-
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The incentive to settle a RICO case can only increase by allowing
an additional jurisdictional option to potential RICO plaintiffs.
State court judges determining the scope of RICO's substantive
provisions will increase the divisiveness and inconsistency already
existing among federal court judges. 237 State court judges may also
be more willing to find a RICO violation in a close case where the
RICO cause of action is based upon state law, since state judges
may be more liberal in applying the familiar law of their own
jurisdiction.238 Thus, while concurrent jurisdiction gives RICO in-
creased flexibility to deal with some situations, it also increases the
possibility the statute will be abused in other circumstances. 239 A
RICO plaintiff may therefore use concurrent jurisdiction, and the
increased uncertainty of RICO's scope of application that will
follow, to enhance an already strong incentive to settle even mer-
itless cases.2 40 As pointed out by Justice Lucas in his dissenting
opinion in Cianci, Congress may thus find that RICO is being
successfully used for the same sort of extortion the statute was
enacted to prevent. 241
CONCLUSION
RICO has already undergone severe criticism for the statute's
increasingly broad application to situations unanticipated by Con-
gress, especially the assertion of the statute against so-called "le-
Victim, supra note 11, at 25 ("[I]f 'legitimate' business people violate RICO's terms they
ought to be called 'racketeers'). The prospect of being labeled a "racketeer" in a RICO
action may lead to prompt favorable settlement of the claim by the defendant. Nathan,
supra note 11, at 342. On the other hand, a "racketeer" label may lead to a commitment
by the defendant not to settle the litigation as long as the charge of "racketeering"
continues. Id. Moreover, the charge may lead a jury to conclude that the defendant is
affiliated with organized crime. Id. at 343. Such a label, however, may create sympathy
for the defendant if the jury feels the plaintiff is unfairly overreaching. Id. at 343.
237. See supra note 160-62 (Justice Lucas' discussion of the division). See also Redish
& Muench, supra note 43, at 334. On the other hand, state courts are becoming more
familiar with and less antagonistic to RICO because the state courts are gaining considerable
experience by enforcing state RICO statutes. See id. See also supra note 139 (discussing
state RICO statutes).
238. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (noting increase likelihood that
state court judges will apply RICO in close cases).
239. GUIDE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 33.
240. See supra note 11-13, 40-41 & 232 (discussing the inherent qualities of RICO as a
device to coerce settlement). See also supra notes 166-68 (Lucas' dissent in Cianci discussing
concurrent jurisdiction as a tool for coercive settlements).
241. Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 930, 710 P.2d 375, 392, 221 Cal. Rptr.
575, 591 (1985). See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (setting forth the dissent's
reasoning).
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gitimate" businesspersons not associated with criminal organizations.
The alarming figures contained in the American Bar Association
study alerted Congress and the courts to what many experts consider
an abuse of the statute. The United States Supreme Court in Sedima
noted the abuse, but concluded that any restrictions upon RICO's
application are for Congress to impose, not the courts. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision in Cianci extended Sedima's liberal
directive to the procedural areas of the statute. Attorneys will
undoubtedly choose the state system when they feel their chances
of success are better by having the action decided in a state court
rather than in a federal court. State courts may therefore be
handling a larger number of RICO claims in the near future. The
number of RICO claims in the state system may well exceed the
number of such claims previously brought in the federal system as
attorneys become more aware of the possible advantages of bringing
a RICO claim in a state court. The possible explosion of RICO
litigation in the state courts should add to the mounting controversy
surrounding the statute.
The increasingly broad sweep of a treble damages statute and
the Supreme Court's reluctance to alter RICO's broad application
has already pressured Congress to take action to restrict the scope
of the statute.242 If Congress determines that concurrent jurisdiction
is preferred, changes in RICO's substantive provisions must occur
to prevent state judiciaries from improperly expanding the federal
laws upon which a RICO cause of action may be based, and to
lessen the chance that RICO will be used for the kinds of activities
the statute was designed to prevent. Congress may, however, choose
to limit the potential for abuse by expressly restricting RICO cases
to the federal system. The Cianci decision favoring concurrent
jurisdiction, and the recent reliance upon Cianci by some of the
242. The momentum to change RICO results in part from the expansive interpretation
the Supreme Court gave the statute in Sedima. Blodgett, Revamping RICO, 71 A.B.A. J.
32 (Dec. 1985). See also GUmE TO RICO, supra note 8, at 109 (discussion of four bills
introduced in Congress in response to Sedima). There is broad-based support for legislation
to amend civil RICO. Id. at 910. Supporters of reform include the ABA, the criminal
defense bar, accountants, bankers, securities professionals, insurance companies, and other
businesspersons. See id. at 910-12 (setting forth comments from various supporters). The
opposition to amending civil RICO has been led by the Justice Department, state attorneys
general, and some public interest groups. See id. at 912-16 (setting forth comments from
those opposing reform). As of March 1986, four bills had been introduced in the 99th
Congress to amend the RICO statute. See GUIDE To RICO, supra note 8, at 109-10
(discussing the various bills). Even if any of these bills were to pass, none of the bills
seeking to amend RICO addresses the issue of jurisdiction. See id. at 109-17.
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federal courts,2 43 hastens the need for Congress to take some sort
of limiting action.
Michael L. Coates
243. Since the Cianci decision, a large and well-supported split concerning whether state
courts have jurisdiction to hear RICO claims divides the federal district courts. Two district
courts have provided a very detailed analysis for the court's conclusion. Karel v. Kroner,
635 F. Supp. 725, 728-31 (N.D. I11. 1986); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717-
18 (E.D. Va. 1986). Six other district courts have either concluded that jurisdiction over
RICO should be concurrent, or suggested this conclusion in a footnote. See, e.g., Carman
v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (no analysis, but concluding
in dictum in favor of concurrent jurisdiction on the basis RICO does not mandate exclusivejurisdiction); Matek v. Murat, 638 F. Supp. 775, 783 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (footnote
suggestion). Two courts have been added to the list of exclusive jurisdiction courts. Massey
v. Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Broadway's Shoes v. San
Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584, 587 (S.D. Tex. 1986). No state's highest court has
addressed the jurisdiction issue since the Cianci decision, although a number of decisions
have been handed down in Illinois indicating that Illinois state courts are favoring exclu-
sivity. Compare Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 495 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Dist. Ct. App.
Ill. 1986) (exclusive) and Ambassador Office Equip., Inc. v. Gallagher, Nos. 84-2050, 84-
2912, slip op. (Dist. Ct. App. Ill. 1986) (exclusive) with Washington Courts Condominium
Ass'n-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., Nos. 85-830, 85-1084, slip op. (Dist. Ct. App. Ill.
1986) (concurrent). If the Illinois Supreme Court determines in favor of exclusive jurisdic-
tion, the state court will be opposite to the federal court in the same geographical
jurisdiction. See Karel v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 728-31 (N.D. I11. 1986) (holding for
concurrent jurisdiction). California will likely see a similar result, but with the state court
determining in favor of concurrent jurisdiction. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, 739 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir. 1984) (using the Gulf Offshore factors, the court concluded that Congress "unmistak-
ably intended" that jurisdiction is exclusive, despite the fact that jurisdictional analysis of
Title VII which does not expressly grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, and the
legislative history is silent on the jurisdiction question).
Regardless of the arguments against concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims, the Cianci
court's analysis has gathered support among some of the federal courts. See Carman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (Cianci cited as support); Karel
v. Kroner, 635 F. Supp. 725, 728-33 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (detailed analysis with full discussion
of Cianc). Because some of the federal courts are now in favor of concurrent jurisdiction
over RICO claims, other state courts will likely follow the lead of the California Supreme
Court. The viability of California's own Cianci decision, however, is very questionable
since the November 4, 1986 ouster of two of the court's majority from that decision.
Governor Deukmejian has appointed Justice Lucas as the new Chief Justice. The Governor
had also previously appointed Justice Panelli to the court. Governor Deukmejian has filled
the remaining vacancies with three appointees more likely in agreement with the views of
Justice Lucas than with the justices comprising the Cianci majority. Thus, the Ciancl
decision may be overturned the next chance the court has to address the RICO jurisdictional
issue. On the other hand, the growing support for the Cianci decision among the federal
district courts, and any limitations which Congress makes with respect to the scope of
RICO's substantive provisions, may persuade Justice Lucas, and those initially agreeing
with the dissent's analysis, to alter their position.
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